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CONSUMER FINANCING, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS, AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: A SOLUTION
TO THE JUDICIAL DILEMMA
An unscrupulous seller approaches an unsophisticated1 buyer and
applies high pressure tactics to persuade her to buy a color television,
saying that the television will be inexpensive because the company
will pay twenty dollars for the name of each purchaser she finds.2 He
further persuades her to sign both an installment contract containing
a waiver-of-defense clause and a promissory note attached to the con-
tract. The seller then assigns the contract and negotiates the note to
a financial institutions with whom he has some continuing relation:
the financial institution undoubtedly provides form notes and contracts,
may purchase all the seller's consumer paper, and may know the seller's
marketing techniques and the quality of his goods. The seller, after
the first twenty-dollar payment, fails to pay the consumer for the names
of buyers she has provided. The television, of course, is defective.
Deciding to withhold payment, the consumer is sued on the note
by the financer, who asserts his protected position as a holder in due
course. 4 If the consumer must pay on the note, she may be unable
I Judicial recognition of consumer ignorance and naivete regarding the ramifications
of credit purchases recurs in the cases in this area. See, e.g., Taylor v. Atlas Security Co.,
213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d
1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 191 Pa. Super. 17, 155 A.2d
405 (1959). For a discussion of unequal bargaining power, see Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J.
101, 110-13, 232 A.2d 405, 410-12 (1967); Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to
Consumer Credit Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 409, 435-36 (1967). Some cases,
however, deny holder-in-due-course protection to financial institutions even when de-
fendant is a business enterprise. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County
Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272
Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965). It would seem that some of the policies involved
(text at notes 14-20 infra) apply to commercial transactions, though to a lesser extent.
Comment, Unico v. Owen: Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course
Under the UCC, 54 U. VA. L. REv. 279, 286 (1968).
2 For cases involving similar schemes, see Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d
494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d
710 (1950); Norman v. World Wide Distribs., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
See generally Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA L. Rxv. 395 (1966).
3 In this note "financial institution" and "financer" will be used interchangeably.
Both terms include commercial banks and sales finance companies. At the end of October
1969, retail outlets held less than 13% of their own consumer paper. Of the remainder,
commercial banks held about 48% and sales finance companies held about 23%. See 55
FED. RlIs. BULL. A54 (Dec. 1969).
4 Failure of consideration and fraud in the inducement are among the defenses the
consumer most frequently seeks to assert against the financer. See Littlefield, Good Faith
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to recoup this loss by suing the seller, who may be insolvent or have
absconded. 5 The consumer's plight in such situations has resulted in
many legislative and judicial modifications of the holder-in-due-course
concept in consumer sales financing.
I
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. State Statutes
It is often argued that the competing policies involved in the
consumer paper problem6 necessitate a legislative solution,7 and over one-
quarter of the states have statutes on the subject.8 Some statutes pre-
clude issuance of consumer notes in fields where abuse has been most
common, such as automobile sales.9 Others require the term "consumer
note" to be printed on these notes and deny holder-in-due-course protec-
tion to possessors of such notes.10 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,11
exhibiting the broadest sweep, both precludes issuance of consumer
notes and, in effect, denies financial institutions a protected position.12
Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. RMv. 48,
62-63 (1966). These are personal, rather than real, defenses, and only real defenses are
available against a holder in due course. For an enumeration of real defenses, see UNi-
roRm COmMERCxAL CODE §§ 3-305(2)(a)-(e) [hereinafter cited as UCC] (All Uniform Com-
mercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Draft unless otherwise specified.). Fraud
in the inducement must be distinguished from fraud in the factum, a real defense. See id.
§ 3-305(2)(c) & Comment 7.
5 See, e.g., International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172
(1965); Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923); Westfield
Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 NJ. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div. 1962).
6 See text at notes 14-29 infra.
7 See Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296, 299 n.6 (9th Cir. 1967);
Comment, Negotiable Instruments: Consumer Versus Financer in Consumer Goods Fi-
nancing-A Judicial Dilemma, 52 MARQ. L. RLv. 285, 301-02 (1968); Comment, supra
note 1, at 292-94.
8 See Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel" Limiting the Use of Negotiable
Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 667, 673-74 &
n.22 (1968); notes 9-11 infra.
9 ORE. REv. STAT. § 83.650(1) (1967); PA. STAT. tit. 69, § 615G (1965). Sellers who vio-
late these provisions are subject to penalties. In Oregon the rights of a holder in due
course are not impaired if the seller takes a consumer note in violation of the law.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 83.650(2) (1967). Pennsylvania has no provision on this subject.
10 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1969); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 255, § 12C
(1968). The latter statute also precludes collection or action on a note obtained in vio-
lation of the provision.
11 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as UCCC] was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 30, 1968,
and was enacted in Oklahoma (OKtA. STAT. tit. 14a, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969)) and
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to -9-103 (1970)).
12 UCCC § 2.403 provides:
In a consumer credit sale . . . the seller ... may not take a negotiable instru-
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B. Conflicting Policies
There are several arguments in favor of such sweeping statutes. 13
One of the most popular is the financer's better ability to bear the loss;14
he can recoup a loss in subsequent transactions whereas the innocent
consumer might find himself bankrupt if defrauded in a single trans-
action. 15 Also, the financer has facilities the consumer lacks to inves-
tigate the dealer's reliability.'" If the financer is involved with the
seller in some continuing relationship, he may have power to correct
abuses.' 7 He can, often does, and should protect himself by arrange-
ments with the seller, such as dealing on a full recourse basis.' 8
Requiring recourse dealing is not, however, the solution to the
consumer paper problem. A recourse agreement does not help the
financer spread the loss if the seller is insolvent or absconds, a frequent
occurrence, and the financer is thus compelled to pursue the buyer.
ment other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer .... A
holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice
that it is issued in violation of this section.
The comment to this section states that professional financers would normally not qualify
as holders in due course with respect to negotiable instruments taken in violation of
§ 2.403 because the section's prohibition would be well known in financial circles.
13 For cases holding for the consumer on the flimsiest facts, to which the
policies are equally applicable, see Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137
S.W.2d 260 (1940) (financer prepared the form notes and contracts, with a printed assign-
ment to him on the back); Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S.
783 (Buffalo City Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (financer
provided form notes and contracts with its name printed at the top; financer gave
credit approval before consummation of the sale). Contra, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.
Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964), where the court protected the financer even
though he allegedly knew of the seller's bait advertising and of frequent complaints to
the Better Business Bureau. In such a case, contrary policies are applicable.
14 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, PROCEED-
INGS, PUBLIC HEARING ON SECOND TENTATIVE DiRAFr OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CEDrr
CODE 141A (June 16-17, 1967) (written comments received) [hereinafter cited as PRO-
CEDMINGs]. The language from Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953),
is frequently quoted:
We think the buyer ... should have some protection somewhere along the
line .... [T]he finance company is better able to bear the risk of the dealer's
insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position to protect his inter-
ests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.
15 Comment, supra note 2, at 417-18.
16 Id. at 417.
17 See id.
18 See id. By signing a note with recourse, the seller guarantees the financer prompt
payment of the obligations contained in the note without requiring any proceeding
against the purchaser. A variation is the full repurchase agreement whereby the seller
promises to repurchase the goods upon repossession and to pay the unpaid portion of the
time balance. Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer
Financing, 1968 WIs. L. REv. 505, 506-07 & n.14. Some financers have reserve agreements
with sellers, whereby the financer sets aside a certain percentage of the finance charges as
a reserve to cover liabilities for losses on repossession. Id. at 507.
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Furthermore, although requiring the financer to extract a recourse
agreement has the advantages of preventing lending to marginal sellers
and of sending needy buyers to more responsible outlets, it has the
grave disadvantage of hindering the development of new businesses19
that have insufficient assets to enter such agreements.
Another argument supporting strict statutory regulation of the
installment sale is that only this will make reality accord with ap-
pearances. The buyer thinks he is borrowing from the seller;20 he is
unaware that his note is being transferred and his defenses cut off.
Refusing to protect the financer may remedy this situation by encour-
aging direct lending,21 but direct lending does not improve the con-
sumer's position: he must still repay the loan if the seller defaults.
In addition, since direct lending is subject to usury laws, consumers
who are not creditworthy at lower rates of interest will be unable to
get loans to buy goods. Conditional sales, on the other hand, are gov-
erned by the time-price doctrine,22 a judge-made exception to the
usury laws. Consequently, direct lending will undoubtedly cause sellers
to lose sales,23 and financers, money.
The primary argument against consumer protection statutes is
economic. The financer's protected position as a holder in due course
encourages him to grant consumer credit; he is willing to take consumer
notes because he knows they will be free from defenses. 24 To deprive
the financer of his protection or to preclude issuance of consumer paper
may restrict the supply of consumer credit, with resulting inability of
some individuals to purchase goods and contraction of the economy. 25
19 See PROCEEDINGS 215-20 (transcript of oral remarks).
20 Jones, Finance companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958
WAsir. U.L.Q. 177, 183.
21 There is some evidence that this is already occurring. Comment, supra note 18,
at 524-25 & n.98.
22 Under this doctrine a time-price differential in conditional sales does not come
within the usury statutes even though the differential exceeds the lawful rate of inter-
est. Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 119, 405 P.2d 339, 342 (1965);
L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF Ta LAW or SALES § 62 (2d ed. 1959).
23 C. PHELPS, INSTALMENT SALES FINANCING: ITS SERVICES TO THE DEALER 10 (1953).
24 Indeed, before accepting an assignment of the contract, the financer usually in.
sists on a waiver-of-defense clause as additional protection. On the validity of these
clauses, see Unico v. Owen, 50 NJ. 101, 123-26, 232 A.2d 405, 417-18 (1967); UCC § 9-206.
See generally Murphy, supra note 8, at 670-71.
25 See Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Upon the Market
for Consumer Installment Credit, 33 LAw & CONTEP. PRoa. 752, 761-63 (1968). But cf.
Felix, Experience with Dealer and Consumer Financing Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 73 BANKING L.J. 229, 233 (1956); Comment, supra note 18, at 524-25 & n.98. Opin-
ions that credit will not contract seem to be based on experiences of large financers,
who undoubtedly do not deal with marginal sellers.
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The statutes will also harm the consumer and the economy by
making inventory financing more expensive. Financers lend to sellers
for inventory purchases at low rates of from five to eight percent in
order to secure profits from consumer paper.26 Since such a low return
is hardly worth the costs,27 destroying the financer's protected position
will undoubtedly cause inventory interest rates to go up, with resulting
higher costs passed on to the consumer.
Another problem with these sweeping statutes is their implicit
assumption that in all cases sellers have great need of financers and that
therefore financers can control sellers' transactions. Financial institu-
tions often keenly compete to finance sellers.28 The statutes fail to
distinguish between those financers who have such a close relationship
to the seller that they should be denied their protected position and
those who do not. In the latter case, the state should not pass to financers
its responsibility of policing sellers.29 Indeed, the differences in seller-
financer relationships make case-by-case development of this problem
more desirable than solution by legislative fiat.
II
JUD umc THEoRY
A. Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-302(1)
Absent a remedial statute, the essential question in each case is
whether the financial institution is a holder in due course. Of the few
cases decided under the Uniform Commercial Code, those that proceed
from the statutory definition of "holder in due course" 30 either twist
26 R. SPEIDEL, R. SuMmlvss & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATMnAS ON COMMERCIAL TRANS-
ACIONS 189 (1969). For cases involving inventory financing, see Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin,
63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Implement
Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954).
27 SPEiDEL, Su mss & WHrrE, supra note 26, at 189.
28 PHELPS, supra note 23, at 10; Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUm L. REv. 445, 471 (1968). During 1960-65 commercial banks
gave finance companies increasing competition, particularly in the area of passenger car
loans. Larger finance companies shifted to other areas; smaller ones merged or went
out of business. Survey of Finance Companies, Mid-1965, 53 FE. Rxs. BuLL. 534, 536
(1967). For a case emphasizing competition among financers, see Lundstrom v. Radio
Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965).
29 Cf. PROCEmGs 296 (transcript of oral remarks). But cf. Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers,
74 N.J. Super. 575, 588-89, 590, 181 A.2d 809, 817, 818 (L. Div. 1962).
30 UCC § 3-302(1) provides:
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
1970]
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the language and legislative intent or follow the language and produce
injustice.
1. Good Faith
Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc.31 is a prime example of
judicial twisting of the UCC's good faith provision.3 2 The court held
that the financer was in bad faith because he had knowledge of sus-
picious circumstances which should have caused him to inquire into the
seller's method of obtaining the note.33 This reasoning virtually ignores
the statutory definition 4 and the legislative history of "good faith."
The 1952 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code added "observance
of reasonable commercial standards" to the requirement of good faith 3
in order to make explicit what had long been implicit in the case
law,36 but this language was later deleted to make clear that a subjec-
tive standard of good faith was intended.37
An attempt to hold for the consumer by use of the good faith
test violates legislative intent in most cases. Because a semi-objective
good faith standard has already been considered and rejected, it is
too late to argue, as some do,38 that this test will help achieve proper
results.
2. Notice
Nor do the notice provisions3 9 help a judge achieve a desirable
result. Section 1-201(25)(c), the most easily satisfied notice requirement,
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any de-
fense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
Negotiable Instruments Law § 52 [hereinafter cited as NIL] is similar. The concept of a
holder in due course presupposes a holder (UCC § 3-301) and a negotiable instrument
(id. §§ 3-102(l)(e), 3-104(1)).
31 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
32 "Good faith" is "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." UCC
§ 1-201(19). See Comment, supra note 1, at 280 n.10.
33 For similar cases twisting the subjective good faith test, see Unico v. Owen, 50
N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) (close connection theory predominates); Westfield Inv.
Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div. 1962). Although the NIL was
applicable in these cases, the courts cited the UCC and apparently tried to reach a
result consistent with it.
34 Note 32 supra.
a5 UCC § 3-302(1)(b) (1952 version) provided: "A holder in due course is a holder
who takes the instrument ... in good faith including observance of the reasonable
commercial standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged ... "
36 UCO § 3-802, Comment 1 (1952 version).
37 See ALl NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFOIR STATE LAws, 1956 REc-
OMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMs&ERCIAL CODE 103.
88 See, e.g., Littlefield, supra note 4.
39 UCC §§ 3-304(1)(b), (6), & § 1-201(25). The latter section provides in part that
[a] person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
[Vol. 55:611
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suggests that one has reason to know of a defense only when such
knowledge necessarily follows from knowledge of other facts.
The consumer paper cases decided under the notice provisions
of the UCC support this view. They hold that knowledge of several
previous complaints about the seller does not constitute notice of a
defense.40 A more liberal interpretation of the notice provision, in
addition to violating the statutory language, undercuts the subjective
good faith test. Moreover, since defenses seldom arise before the financer
purchases the note, use of the "notice" definition entails rewriting it
to read "reason to know that [the defense] will exist." Thus following
the Code necessitates holding for the financer4 l in all but the most
extreme cases.
B. The Common Law Approach: The Close Connection Theory
Many of the Negotiable Instruments Law cases and some of the
UCC cases ignore the statutory language and develop common law
theories; 42 some use common law theories almost interchangeably with
the statutory theories of good faith and notice.43
The most common extra-statutory theory relied on in the consumer
paper dilemma is the close connection theory, also referred to as the
original party theory and the moving party theory.44 The classic
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he
has reason to know that it exists.
40 Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964), held
knowledge of bait advertising, knowledge of frequent complaints to the Better Business
Bureau, and knowledge of a report to the Attorney General would not, if proven, con-
stitute notice of a defense. Citing Universal CJ.T., Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski,
4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967), held that receipt of several previous complaints
did not constitute notice.
41 Using the unconscionability provision, § 2-302, to hold for the consumer (see Unico
v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967)) is dubious. "Section 2-302 was included in
the sales article solely for the purpose of authorizing judicial nullification of contract
terms which are unconscionable." Comment, supra note 1, at 287 (emphasis added). For
rejection of the idea that § 9-206 helps the consumer defend against suit on his note, see
id. at 287-88.
42 The use of common law theories is more understandable under the NIL, where
"good faith" is not defined and where "notice" is defined in terms of "bad faith." See
NIL § 56.
43 See, e.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953) (notice and close
connection theories); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) (good faith and
close connection theories); Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 NJ. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809
(L. Div. 1962) (notice, good faith, agency, and close connection theories); Davis v. Com-
mercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950) (good faith, notice, and
original party theories).
44 The agency theory and joint venture theory are variations. Under the agency
theory, the financer cannot be a holder in due course because he is the seller's prin-
cipal. For use of this theory, see International Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137
N.W.2d 172 (1965). For a criticism of its theoretical soundness, see Littlefield, supra note
1970]
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formulation of this theory appears in the landmark case of Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs:45
We think appellant was so closely connected with the entire trans-
action... that it can not be heard to say that it, in good faith, was
an innocent purchaser of the instrument for value before ma-
turity.... Rather than being a purchaser of the instrument after
its execution it was to all intents and purposes a party to the
agreement and instrument from the beginning.46
This theory has the advantage of focusing judicial attention on the
relevant question, the nature of the relationship between the seller
and the financer. Unfortunately, the application of this theory has
been defective. Some courts have muddled the close connection test
with the question of good faith,47 thus introducing all the problems
of the latter term of art; some have used the test almost exclusively,
ignoring the statutory definition of a holder in due course. 48 If the
only way to use this theory is to ignore section 3-302(1), then consumer-
oriented decisions based on this rationale are erroneous. Section 3-302(1)
was apparently intended to cover consumer notes.49
C. UCC Section 3-305(2)
Section 3-305(2),5o often overlooked in this context,51 appears to
be a solution to the judicial dilemma imposed by the holder-in-due-
4, at 67-68. For use of the joint venture theory, see Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De Marzio,
162 Misc. 742, 296 N.YS. 783 (Buffalo City Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
45 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
46 Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262. Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d
296, 299 (9th Cir. 1967), expressed this theory as follows:
[A] financing company should be denied holder in due course status if it was a
moving party in the sales transaction itself and thus in substance an original
party to the note which the sale produced; but . . . a financing company should
be accorded holder in due course status if it was a business entity separate and
apart from the seller and confined itself to extending a line of credit upon being
presented with an acceptable business venture.
Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739, 742 (Del. 1969), expressed the
rationale of this theory:
[T]he more the holder knows about the underlying transaction .... the more
he controls or participates in it, the less he fits the role of good faith purchaser
for value; and the less justification there is for according to him the protected
status of holder in due course considered necessary for the free flow of paper
in the commercial world.
47 See, e.g., quotation in text at note 46 supra.
48 See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); American Plan Corp.
v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
49 See UCC § 3-103; § 9-206, Comment 2.
50 Section 3-305(2) provides: "To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course
he takes the instrument free from .. . all defenses of any party to the instrument with
whom the holder has not dealt ...."
51 Courts have not made use of the language "party . . .with whom the holder
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course concept, for it implies that mere satisfaction of the requirements
of section 3-302(1) is insufficient to allow the financer to take an instru-
ment free from personal defenses.52
This inference is supported by the distinction the Code makes
between the claims from which a holder in due course is free and the
defenses to which he is subject: while he "takes the instrument free
from all claims to it on the part of any person," 53 he takes it only
"free from... all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom
[he] has not dealt ... ."54 The Code also makes a distinction between
those who can assert defenses against a holder in due course and those
who can assert them against a holder not in due course. 55
The history of section 3-305(2), notwithstanding silence in the
explanatory comment, also suggests that the draftsmen did not want
all who satisfy section 3-302(1) to take free from personal defenses.5 6 In-
stead of adopting the NIL provision that a holder in due course takes
"free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves,' 157 the
drafters used the language "any party."5 This language was later
changed to "any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt ..... 59
Since the UCC does not 'define "dealt," a liberal interpretation
can be given to it.6o Thus section 3-305(2) allows the courts to find that
a sufficiently close seller-financer relationship makes the buyer a "party
with whom the financer has dealt;" the consumer can then assert per-
sonal defenses against him.61
has not dealt" in § 3-305(2) in the context of the consumer paper problem. Some cases and law
review notes deal with whether a payee can be a holder in due course, a problem under
NIL § 52(4) and § 30 that § 3-302(2) was designed to solve. See, e.g., Waterbury Say.
Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967); Saale v. Interstate Steel
Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 1, 275 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dep't 1966), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 933, 228
N.E.2d 397, 281 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1967); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146
A.2d 154 (1958); Note, The Concept of Holder in Due Course in Article III of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 1573, 1578-79 (1968); 16 CAam. U.L. REv. 450,
453 (1967). There is nothing in § 3-305(2), however, that confines its application to
payee problems.
52 See Note, supra note 51, at 1578-79.
53 UCC § 3-305(l) (emphasis added).
54 Id. § 3-305(2) (emphasis added).
55 Compare § 3-305(2), with § 3-306(b) ("all defenses of any party") (emphasis added).
56 See Note, supra note 51, at 1578-79.
57 NIL § 57 (emphasis added). Compare CoMrarCUAL CODE art. III, § 48 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1946): "In the hands of any person including a holder in due course an instru-
ment is subject to the following defenses on the part of any prior party . (em.
phasis added).
58 COMMRCIAL CODE art. III, § 48 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1947) (emphasis added).
59 UCC § 3-305(2) (emphasis added).
60 See 16 CAmH. U.L. REv. 450, 453 (1967).
61 While the consumer should be able to defend himself against suit by such a
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III
CLOSE CONNECTIONS QUALIFYING THE FINANCER AS HAVING "DEALT"
WiTH THE BUYER: FACTUAL VARIATIONS
Generally the cases do not specify which aspect of a given relation-
ship makes the seller and the financer so closely related that the financer
is an original party, or whether only the combination of relationships
is decisive. Rational decision-making and the desirability of predict-
ability require analysis of the facts.
Some fuiictions of the financer are essentially credit functions
rather than selling functions;62 they do not so involve the financer in
the seller's business that the financer has control over the seller or
knowledge of his dishonesty. These functions include the following:
providing the seller with forms of contracts and notes,63 even if they
contain the financer's name, 64 or a form endorsement to the financer;
6 5
supplying interest tables to the seller; 66 making a credit check on
the buyer before approving credit;67 buying the note at discount
soon after the consumer's execution of it;6s and having a reserve
financer, he should not be able to sue him; the policies favoring use of the close con-
nection theory as a shield-concern about unequal bargaining power, dishonest sellers,
risk-spreading-do not apply equally to use of the close connection theory as a sword.
Moreover, § 3-305(2) applies only to defenses.
62 See Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1967).
63 This relationship is present in virtually every consumer paper case. Since the
financer hesitates to purchase notes or contract rights on unfamiliar forms, denying
holder-in-due-course status in such a situation would have serious effects on the free
flow of credit. Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954).
64 See, e.g., Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967);
Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967). But cf.
Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941). The presence of the
financer's name on the note, as for example payee, is still essentially a part of the credit
function of the financer. Also, the consumer in such a case should be aware that another
party is involved in addition to the seller.
65 See, e.g., Mann v. Leasko, 179 Cal. App. 2d 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1960). But ef.
Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941), in which the financer
is denied holder-in-due-course status. Palmer is perhaps distinguishable from the former
case in that the note contained five alternate forms of endorsement, suggesting that the
financer tried to secure the legal status most advantageous to him in each case.
66 See, e.g., White System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227
(1951).
67 See, e.g., Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964). Contra,
Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
68 See, e.g., Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967).
Contra, Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 60 (1940).
[Vol. 55:611
CONSUMER FINANCING
or repurchase agreement with the seller.69 To deny a financei his
protected position because he has one or all of these relationships
with the seller discourages consumer credit and unduly hinders the
development of new businesses. In such cases it is inequitable to make
the financer bear the loss and the consequent responsibility of policing
the seller.
However, financer control of the seller, for example, by setting
the terms of the seller-buyer agreement,7 0 or substantial involvement
in the seller-buyer transaction should cause him to lose his protected
position. Such involvement includes: seller-financer consultation about
the seller-buyer transaction; knowledge of its details;71 and carrying out
part of the bargain.72 In these cases the policy of encouraging negotia-
bility is weak and that of making the financer bear the loss is strong;
since the financer undoubtedly has power to correct the seller's abuses,73
he should not take consumer notes free from personal defenses.
Knowledge of the seller's dubious marketing techniques,7 4 knowl-
edge of his inferior merchandise 7 or knowledge of numerous customer
complaints76 should also cause the financer to lose his protected posi-
tion. While these factors do not present as strong a case for the consumer
as does financer control or involvement, they still support imposing
the loss on the financer rather than on the consumer. The financer's
mere credit functions are tainted.
In many cases there is no direct evidence of the financer's knowl-
69 For discussion of these agreements, see note 18 and accompanying text supra.
For a case in which a reserve account did not preclude the financer's taking free of
personal defenses, see Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d
657 (1954).
70 See Unico v. Owen, 50 NJ. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967), in which the court found
that the financer set the terms of an unfair phonograph record agreement; the financer-
seller contract required the seller-buyer contract to conform to it. Generally, the effect
of such a provision on the financer's freedom from defenses should depend on the kinds
of provisions in the financer-seller contract.
71 Both elements were present in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach.
Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
72 In Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), financer
procured insurance for the buyer and obtained the television repair contracts that the
sales contract required. For another case in which financer's obtaining of insurance had
relevance, see Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923).
73 See text at note 17 supra.
74 See, e.g., Norman v. World Wide Distribs., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115
(1963). Contra, Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339
(1965).
75 See, e.g., Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923);
Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E2d 710 (1950).
76 Contra, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847
(1964).
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edge of the seller's dishonesty.7 7 The following factors are relevant in
weighing the circumstantial evidence of the connection between the
seller and the financer: the financer's access to information about the
seller's goods; 78 knowledge of the seller's financial status;79 discount
rate;80 percent of the financer's business which comes from the seller;"'
percent of the seller's notes which the financer buys; formation of the
financial institution to finance the seller;8 2 and common membership
in the selling and financing institutions.8 If the quantity and quality
of circumstantial evidence make it highly probable that the financer
knew of the seller's dishonesty, the financer should be denied a pro-
tected position.
Joan I. Oppenheimer
77 See Comment, supra note 1, at 290.
78 In Unico v. Owen, 50 NJ. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967), the financer had the right
to inspect seller's inventory.
79 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d
819 (1950). If the defense the consumer seeks to assert is failure of consideration, knowl-
edge of seller's pending insolvency might preclude the financer's protected position. See
Comment, supra note 1, at 290 n.42. Otherwise such information should not deprive the
financer of his protected position, since a credit check on the seller is essential to the
financer in determining whether to finance the dealer's inventory.
80 A high discount rate could show merely the seller's need for money rather than
the financer's control of a fraudulent transaction. In Mann v. Leasko, 179 Cal. App. 2d
692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1960), the financer purchased an $850 note for $589; the court held
that a high discount does not destroy a financer's holder-in-due-course status unless the
consideration is merely nominal or the discount rate compels the inference that the
negotiation is fraudulent, illegal, or unauthorized. In Financial Credit Corp. v. Wil-
liams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967), the court held that an 80% discount alone was
insufficient to show bad faith. However, the high discount rate together with the
woeful history of the dealer, which was known to every Marylander, caused the financer
to lose his protected position.
81 Compare Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969)
(99% of financer's business came from the selling subsidiaries of its parent corpora-
tion), with Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967) (10%
of financer's business came from seller). There were, of course, other factors distinguish-
ing the unprotected financer in the former case from the protected one in the latter.
82 Compare Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969),
and Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) (protected position denied), with
Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954) (protected posi-
tion allowed).
83 Family relationship between the members of the two companies, when taken
with other factors, argued against the financer's protected position in Taylor v. Atlas
Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923). The financer was not protected
when he wholly owned both the selling and financing agencies. Toms v. Nugent, 12
So. 2d 713 (La. Ct. App. 1943). Where the owner of the finance company once owned
the selling company, but sold it "some time ago" and severed connections with it, a
protected position was granted. International Fin. Co. v. Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309,
161 A. 613 (1932).
